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In any contest between rivals, there are always some elements of the material and 
cerebral. In the opaque world of psychological warfare, PSYOPS to some or Military 
Information Support (MISO) for those hoping for a more sociable appeal, has more often 
than not operated within the later spheres of human conflict. Similarly, in an era in which 
old-school domination vis-à-vis martial annihilation seems passé, notions of 
“influencing” civilian inhabitants to better conform to a state’s national interests, 
including counterinsurgency (COIN) and its seemingly more sexy brethren 
counterterrorism (CT), have become the operative vogues of the day. Correspondingly, 
only the modest of endeavors has been sought after in this ongoing scholastic voyage.  
The primary purpose of this study is to ignite or reignite a thorough discussion on the 
efficacy of such battles of the mind. In short, a brief historical sampling has been 
conducted demonstrating where PSYOPS initiatives have been undertaken so as to 
evaluate their effectiveness, identify potencies and shortcomings, and to raise potential 
reservations of the practice itself. Special attention is paid to aerial bombardments of old 
(strategic bombing) in order to demonstrate where underlying psychological impacts on 
the adversary were effective or not effective even with or without PSYOPS programs 
embedded within them. Such analogous studies appear more pertinent now, given the 
Western penchant for using drones as a means of messaging opponents, not to mention its 
relation to the overarching theme of the (R)evolution of War, if there ever was such a 
thing. 
It must be noted however, that much of what is stated in this discussion and not 
definitive statement per say with regards to this psychosomatic tool is indeed repetitive, 
built upon the intellectual shoulders of others, and that any budding insight will be more 
of this author’s opinion rather unquestionable empirical fact. To reiterate, the scope, 
depth, and certainly the overall quality of this cautious study is to merely restart a 
conversation on the efficacy of PSYOPS, its utility in its own right in addition to its 
collaboration with other military assets, and should be consumed only in this fashion. In 
this spirit, an added purpose of this study is to augment questions along with points of 
limitations with regards to whatever grounding and methodological understanding we 
have when it comes to military action and desired psychological outcomes. It is not the 
purpose of this paper to give new answers or even statistical figures due to the difficulty 
of retrieving information when considering “obliteration” to some degree and people’s 
perceptions thereafter.  
Methodologically, a scanning of what many consider to be “reputable” foreign 
policy think-tanks (US and international), mainstream U.S. media, in accordance with 
other open-source material of U.S. governmental agencies were all cross-referenced for 
consistencies and inconsistencies in terms of this topic’s focus; the psychological 
manipulation—with or without specific PSYOPS programs implanted—of adversaries in 
conjunction with military application. Such admittedly crude observations have revealed 
an impression, at least to this author, that at present, the intellectual debate involving 
psychological combat has at the moment been marginal, and nearly non-existent when 
combined with certain martial functions; kinetic action in union with perception agendas. 
Conversely, and perhaps inevitably, between the increased discourses for the necessities 
of “Strategic Communication” via narratives and the legal as well as ethical 
considerations of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), this middle ground of 21
st
 century 
target precision and the potential psychological persuasions that could be reaped from it 
does not appear to be pursued to any meaningful degree. To the contrary, while 
acknowledging there may in fact be deliberations behind closed doors and classified 
sessions, much of the intellectual traffic regarding precision strikes and the emotional 
effects on potential opponents seems more geared towards deliberating on whether the 
enemy can be deterred or contained, and to whether precision beatings are in fact judicial 
and possibly counter productive.
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 Such is one of the primary motives for seeking 
discovery in this small slice of armed employment. 
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Affairs, 92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43, and Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive 
In the end, like airpower in the general sense, this paper will reinforce the 
impression that psychological attacks do not appear to accomplish the mission alone, but 
are more or less successful when incorporated inside the overall military campaign. One 
can only hope that such a thesis would be useful given the propensity of drones—the 
inherit descendant of traditional bombers—in this day and age. Simply put, to the diehard 
enthusiast, psychological warfare is everything from a force protector, combat multiplier, 
and even economical non-lethal weapons systems. To the critic, PSYOPS will always be 
the bridesmaid but never the bride. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Strategy," Foreign Affairs, 92, no. 4 (2013): 44-54, for an interesting debate regarding the utility of 
drones. 
